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Introduction:

In 2001, Enron was forced to file bankruptcy due to fraudulent
accounting practices (Enron) . In 2003, the CEO of HealthSouth was
charged with $1.4 billion in accounting fraud (SEC). In 2002, the SEC
filed charges against former senior executives of Rite Aid for many
fraudulent accounting practices including overstating net income by
$1.6 billion (SEC).
Riding the waves created by the above-mentioned fraudulent activities, it is difficult for investors and the general public to trust companies and their financial statements. After much research on the
underlying causes of fraud and ways to detect it, the key component
of fraud is intent. Intent is the fine line between fraud a nd ea r nings
management. Earnings management is the act of smoothing income
to make a company more attractive to investors. Investors, as a general rule, do not desire to invest in companies with volatile earnings.
Timing investments, sales, and expenditures are legitimate ways of
smoothing earnings (Magrath and Weld 2002). The problem begins
where the legitimacy ends. Fraud can be difficult to det ect becau se,
obviously, the people committing fraud are also committed to hi'ding
it.
F ASB Pronouncements:

All FASB pronouncements are relevant to fra udulent accounting
due to the fact that fra ud occurs when the procedures described by the
pronouncements are not adhered to. In 2002, President Bush signed a
new law that was designed to reform business practices in an attempt
to make it more difficult to report fraudulently. The law is the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Implications:

According to Magrath and Weld (2002), in 1998, Chairman of th e
SEC, Arthur Levitt expressed his concern on the issue of earnings
management, and threatened any company suspect ed of the act. He
failed to draw a distinction between abusive earnings m a nagem ent
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and normal earnings management. He did, however, list techniques
that suggested he was talking exclusively about fraudulent earnings
management, such as cookie jar reserves, creative acquisition
accounting, big bath restructuring charges, immaterial incorrect
applications of accounting principles, and premature recognition of
revenues. Since these sorts of techniques are hard for investors and
other outsiders to detect, Magrath and Weld (2002) offer some early
warning signs that companies may be exercising fraudulent accounting practices.
The first warning sign is the failure for cash flows to correlate with
earnings. Cash flows should correspond with earnings. If they do not
match, there is a possibility that revenues are being artificially
increased by early recognition or false sales. Receivables should also
correlate with revenues. The failure to be correlated could be a sign
that the company is recording false sales or receivables. The
allowance for doubtful accounts not matching the receivables account
is a sign that they may be purposefully understating or recording false
sales. Reserve accounts should be correlated with particular balance
sheet items, such as warranties, future commissions, and allowance
for doubtful accounts. These not matching their counterparts could
indicate earnings manipulations. Acquisition reserves should be closely scrutinized for their legitimacy by investors. There is the possibility, if a company has large reserves for acquisition of new assets or
restructuring, they are overstated. The last of the warning signs that
Magrath and Weld (2002) offer is too much consistency. Companies
that consistently meet analysts' expectations are possibly exercising
fraudulent accounting. The incentive to practice fraudulent accounting is the company's desire to meet these expectations to protect their
value and reputation in the market.
Geriesh (2003) expresses the relationship between organizational
cultures and accounting procedures through research of 160 companies, half of which had been convicted of issuing fraudulent financial
reports and the other half of which had not been found guilty of such
practices. Geriesh (2003) compared the organizational culture of the
fraudulent companies to those companies not guilty of fraudulent
accounting. The first cultural behavior in question was related-party
transactions. The other behavioral questions include the history of the
company relative to fraudulent behavior, the influence of founders on
the board of directors, and the influence of CPA's on the board of directors.
The findings of Geriesh (2003) indicate there is a correlation
b~tween_these behaviors and fraudulent activities within companies.
Firms with more founders and less CPA's on the board of directors are
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more likely to behave fraudulently than companies without these
characteristics. Firms that are involved in related-party transactions
are also more likely to use fraudulent accounting procedures. Also,
there appears to be a trend in the history of the fraudulent companies. Companies that have not committed fraud before are less likely
to commit fraud than those who have done it in the past. This is also
consistent with the ideas of Magrath and Weld (2002), who believe in
the domino effect. Once a company prematurely recognizes revenue,
they must continue to do so in order to keep up with analysts' expectations.
Hotaling and Lippitt (2003) feel part of the blame for the rise in
fraudulent accounting is due to FASB itself. They believe that in
order to comply with FASB pronouncements, accountants are not
allowed to exercise much judgment and, therefore, are not able to
adhere to the basic structure that supports the pronouncements and
our reporting rules. They make their case based on the fact that all
FASB pronouncements are not all-inclusive and some are extremely
complex. Not all types of transactions are covered by the pronouncements and, therefore, some transactions have to be defined by the
rules in order to be accounted for in a specific manner. The rules that
Hotaling and Lippitt (2003) mention are as follows: accounting for
leases, research and development (R&D) expenditures, stock options,
and special purpose entities (SPEs).
The guidelines used for determining whether a lease is capital or
operating provides some scope to structure the lease so that, regardless of the actual economic reality of the transaction, it meets the com pany's needs. For example, a company can lease an asset for 74.9% of
the estimated useful life of the asset and still classify it as an operating lease even though for the majority of the life of the asset it will be
in the lessee's control. R&D expenditures are to be expensed immediately according to GAAP because FASB feels that it is difficult to
measure future economic benefits from these sorts of expenditures .
Hotaling and Lippitt (2003) feel that this is inappropriate because
many of these expenditures produce assets that clearly increase the
value of the company's stock. While FASB feels that the fair value
method of accounting for stock options is more reflective of actual economic costs, they allow companies to use the intrinsic method as long
as the fair value method is disclosed in footnotes . Hotaling and
Lippitt (2003) feel that this is due to FASB conceding to pressure from
industries and politics. Accounting for SPEs is another area of concern. A lessee can avoid consolidating special purpose entity's statements if one of the following guidelines fails to be met: the SPE was
created specifically to solely benefit the lessee, the lessee gu ar a ntees
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the SPE's debt, and the lessee owns at least 98% of the equity in the
SPE. For example, if a lessee creates a SPE specifically for its own
benefit and guarantees its debt, the debt does not have to show up
anywhere but in the notes if at least three percent of the SPE is owned
by someone else.
Hotaling and Lippitt (2003) feel it is time for FASB to do something
about some of these pronouncements. They are opposed to F ASB being
dictated by politics, especially when the end results are not in conjunction with the real economic picture . They also express their concern that accountants and auditors are not allowed the freedom to use
educated judgment in order to express the economic reality of a company in their financial statements.
Phillips, et al. (2003) explored the possibility of using deferred tax
expense as a tool for detecting earnings management. The idea they
share is that, because of the differences in tax laws and GAAP, managers can report less income for tax purposes by creating temporary
book-tax differences. For example: managers can play with depreciation expense to have their financial statements show the net income
they desire, but not pay taxes on the increased income because for tax
purposes they can only use certain depreciation measures and GAAP
is fairly flexible regarding the type of depreciation and the length of
the useful lives of depreciable assets. Their research is based on the
prior research of Mills and Newberry (2001), which provided evidence
that firms with more incentives for earnings management have larger book-tax differences than firms with fewer incentives.
Phillips, et al. (2003) tested three hypotheses: (1) the effectiveness
of using deferred tax expense to detect earnings management to avoid
a decline in earnings; (2) using deferred tax expense to detect earnings
management to avoid a loss; (3) and using deferred tax expense to
detect earnings management to avoid failing to match analysts' forecasts. Their samples consisted of only United States corporations
because foreign companies have different accounting issues. They
excluded financial institutions and utilities because they would have
different incentives for managing earnings. They also excluded partnerships and other flow through entities because they do not account
for income tax expense. They could only include information starting
after SFAS No 109 became effective, since it caused many changes in
GAAP for income tax reporting purposes. Their statistical research
was based on formulas derived from the previous research of
Bugs~a~ler and Dichev (1997), Healy (1985), Dechow (1995, 2002).
Ph1lhps, et al. (2003) found their results to support two out of three
of t~eir hypo~heses. They found that deferred tax expense can be useful m detectmg earnings management in regards to avoiding losses
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and avoiding reporting a decline in earnings but not in avoiding failing to match analysts' forecasts. They suggest that further research
take the following into consideration: managerial guidance, components of deferred tax expense, and the usefulness of deferred tax
expense in other settings.
Beneish and Vargus (2002) explored insider trading as a basis for
determining earnings quality and the impact of accruals on earnings
management. They suggest that, based on the fact that managers
have relevant private information about economic factors that affect
earnings quality, they can and will trade based on this information.
They also suggest that auditors and investors fail to realize the potential for earnings management through accruals. They show that companies with income-increasing accruals and unusual insider selling
have abnormal accruals that suggest ea rnings management and a
larger tendency to report larger profits due to income-increasing
accruals. They propose that investors should be made aware of insider trading. Their research is based on the belief that stock prices create expectations of earnings quality.
The beliefs of Beneish and Vargus (2002) led them to several
hypotheses. Their hypotheses propose that the relevance of incomeincreasing accruals and income-decreasing accruals can be suggest ed
by insider buying and selling, and that the expectations caused by
market prices fail to reflect the relevance of insider trading. Their
sample began with all of the companies listed on the Compustat
Industrial, Research, and Full Coverage 1998 tapes for the years 1985
through 1997. They excluded financial service companies, companies
without December year ends, companies with discontinued oper ations
that were equal to more than five percent of total assets, and those
without enough information to compute accruals. They ended up with
a sample consisting of 3,906 firms from 1985 through 1996. They
retrieved their insider trading information from the National
Archives Center for Electronic Records and from Thomas Financial.
Their statistical research formulas wer e based on prior r esearch on
insider trading by Baesel and Stein (1979), Nunn et al. (1983), Seyhun
(1986), and Lin a nd Howe (1990).
The research of Beneish and Vargus (2002) shows that insider trading is a relevant factor in determining earnings quality and the importance of accruals. Th_ey provide evidence that investors t end to have
faith in the quality of income-increasing accruals a nd that the relevance of income-incr easing accruals is linked to insider selling and
buying. Income-increasing accruals, along with insider buying, is a
sign of higher quality accruals. Income-increasing accruals, along
with insider selling, is a sign of lower quality accruals. They suggest
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that future research take the following into consideration: isolation of
the motives of insider trading, the separate components of accruals,
and basis of investors' optimism related to companies.
Conclusion:

In a capitalistic society, it is imperative that investors be able to
trust the worthiness of financial statements, accountants, and auditors. Fraud detection is key to the survival of our society. It is almost
impossible to determine the intent of key decision makers of corporations, but it is easy to be leery of any inconsistencies in their statements and accounting practices.
There are many ways of committing fraud: premature revenue
recognition, insider trading, inflating reserve accounts, playing with
accruals, exploiting the differences between financial accounting and
tax accounting, just to name a few. The best way to detect fraud is to
be aware that it exists in many different forms. Fraud is a major problem, not just for the companies who practice it or the accountants and
auditors linked with fraudulent companies, but also for the accounting profession. Reputation is key to the future of any profession.
Detecting fraud is important in protecting the reputation of the
accounting profession.
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